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Abstract
This paper establishes an agent-based model to describe the dynamic behaviour
of the financial market with mutual fund managers and investors under two types
of compensation contracts: asset-based fees and performance-based fees, and using
two types of adaptive expectation: trend chaser and contrarian. Our results show
that both of trading strategies of trend chaser and contrarian destabilise the mar-
ket. However, trend chasers always trigger significant fluctuations, while contrarian
traders bring along the slight up and down oscillations. The types of compensation
contracts change the behaviour of contrarian traders, but have no influence to trend
chaser. We also find that inertia parameter decrease the stability of market and in-
duce market price to be underestimated. In particular, the heterogenous analysis
under different compensation contracts shows that asset maximisers dominate the
whole market and produce higher returns, which can be used to explain the cur-
rent situation in real market that most of mutual funds choose asset-based contract.
Moreover, the coexistence of two compensation schemes may amplify market fluc-
tuations and create bubbles.
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1 Introduction
Since the creation of the first fund in 1924, mutual funds have mushroomed over the
past ninety years. Rather than managed by private investors, a significant share of fi-
nancial wealth is delegated to professional mutual fund managers. In 1940, there were
approximately 68 funds with $0.45 billions in assets. By the end of 2013, the number of
funds have increased to 7707. They are with $15,017.68 billions in assets1. Nowadays,
mutual funds and fund managers are playing important roles on financial industry.
They control a large and increasing percentage of the aggregate wealth of investors.
However, a potential conflict of interest between mutual fund managers and their in-
vestors arises from these considerable controls. Because a mutual fund can be consid-
ered as a black box which converts investor’s cash into returns, what really happens
inside the box remains unclear to investors (Malkiel, 1995).
The absence of costless, complete information and the presence of moral hazard are
where these conflicts stem from. Baumol et al. (1989) suggested that the primary service
supplied by mutual fund manager is portfolio management, which includes conducting
research and making fund investment decisions. In return, fund managers receive com-
pensation fees under advisory contract for providing those services. On the one hand,
investor assumes that fund manager has common objective with him, which is to max-
imise expected fund’s return. On the other hand, the resources fund manager expends
on managing portfolio are in a black box and can not be observable directly. Investor
cannot distinguish the effect of a manager’s choice from the effect of the randomly de-
termined state of nature. Likewise, exclusively from the observed outcome, investor
cannot costlessly distinguish risk level of a manager’s choice. Moreover, there are not
many financial regulations to constrain the structure of compensation fees. As Jensen
and Meckling (1976) suggested, many of the advisory contracts were only depended on
the underlying contracting environment. The question arises is that whether the portfo-
lio selected is optimal for investor as well as fund manager, since manager may choose
a portfolio with risk level that is not compatible with investor’s expectation.
Murphy (1999) suggested that it is optimal for contracts to provide a stronger link be-
tween compensation fees and investor welfare, particularly when investors know little
about the production function linking managerial action and investors’ objective func-
12014 Investment Company Fact Book (http://www.icifactbook.org/index.html)
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tion. The task is to give fund manager a right incentive to make the best efforts and
to achieve the same expectation as investor. This contract should detail a risk sharing
rule with scheduled monetary rewards. It should also contain a compensation policy of
managers. Stracca (2006) reviewed literature on delegated portfolio management with
respects to a principal agent relationship between an investor (the principal) and a fund
manager (the agent). He pointed out the fact that it was difficult to design an optimal
contract which is compatible with the both incentives of investor and manager. The rea-
son is that the manager controls all the efforts and the risks. In industry practice, people
tend to favour simple compensation schemes. These schemes are usually asset-based
and linearly depend on the value of the managed assets. As Ou-Yang (2003) suggested,
a portfolio manager should receive a fixed with a fraction of the total assets under man-
agement. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) supported these asset-based compensations
by showing that the linear sharing rule is an optimal contract as it induces an optimal
trade-off between risk sharing and effort inducement.
In recent years, performance-based schemes have involved in the advisory contracts
of many large mutual fund companies, which induced increasing policy discussions
and research literature on performance-based incentives. Not like asset-based scheme
which depends on the amount of assets, performance-based incentive scheme is based
on the performance measures, such as net realised and unrealised gains. One of the
claimed advantages of this incentive fee is that better fund’s performance is expected
from this sort of contract. From agency literature point of view, Starks (1987) showed
that the symmetric type of performance-based compensation contract was in aligning
the manager’s interests with those of investors. Eichberger et al. (1999) also found the
equilibriums where all fund mangers behave exactly as desired by investors. They sug-
gested that the past relative performance-based reward schemes may arise as optimal
contracts.
Moreover, some of the papers has found a significant effect of past performance on
the mutual funds and the risk taking behaviour of their fund managers, which support
the performance-based incentive contract further. Chevalier and Ellison (1997) provided
empirical evidences that the fund’s past returns create incentives for fund managers to
alter their risk taking behaviours and to change their portfolio choices. There are more
papers focused on the strong relationship between flows of new investment into mutual
fund and their past performance, such as Ippolito (1992), Sirri and Tufano (1992), Patel
3
et al. (1994), Roston (1996) and Goetzmann et al. (1997).
However, there are some arguments regarding whether or not performance-based
scheme should be involved in advisory contract. Bines and Thel (2004) declaimed that
fund manager under performance-based contract might fail to take into account many
other components of management, such as portfolio diversification, risk management.
Damato (2005) argued that performance-based fees might encourage fund managers to
take excessive risks and gamble with their portfolios to obtain higher returns.Moreover,
Mendoza and Sedano (2009) suggested that performance-based fees would fail to pro-
vide additional incentives to fund managers paid on increased assets.
Taken into account the rise of performance-based schemes and the popularity of
asset-based schemes, comparing these two compensation schemes appears to be an im-
portant task. In this paper, in order to understand the implications of incentive con-
tracts, we study a financial market with mutual fund managers and their clients under
two compensation schemes: asset-based fees and performance-based fees. An agent-
based model is established to describe the dynamic behaviours of a market with in-
vestors and mutual fund managers. Investors hire their fund managers according to
managers’ performance in the past. The manager with better past performance will at-
tract more followers. For managers, they are myopic and make investment decisions by
forecasting the market price in the following period. Therefore, the coexistence of two
compensation schemes creates a heterogenous market with two types of fund managers:
asset maximisers and return maximisers. Asset Maximisers are motivated by asset-based
compensation schemes and aim to maximise the expected assets they manage. The
managers who are under performance-based compensation schemes aim to maximise
the returns of portfolios. This makes them to be Return Maximisers.
Our paper is very related with the study of Palomino (2005). They evaluated the
consequence of an economy with the combination of fund managers’ asset-based com-
pensation schemes and investors’ fund picking rules. Investors always use a relative
performance rule to evaluate mutual fund managers and allocate money into funds.
They found that these relative performance objectives increase the riskiness of the in-
vestment strategies. They also suggested that under the relative performance picking
rules, asset-based compensation schemes increased investors’ expected returns. In our
paper, we also establish a model with the combination of fund managers’ compensation
schemes and investors’ fund picking rules. However, instead of exclusively studying
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one contract, we investigate both asset-based and performance-based schemes. These
two compensation schemes are also discussed in Cuoco and Kaniel (2011). They used
a dynamic general-equilibrium setting while our paper considered agent-based model
with multi-equilibriums. They found that asset-based fees distorted the risk level of
managed portfolios. It increases asset prices and has negative effect on the performance
of the investment. They also found that the effects of performance-based fees fluctuate
stochastically over time in response to variations in the excess performance of funds. In
our study, we give consistent results with all these papers, but under a complex system
context. Moreover, we are able to observe the coexistence of these two contracts and the
dynamic behaviour of the market.
One of the main contributions in this paper is that we not only observe a single type
of fund manager in a homogenous market, but also show the complex behaviours that
how heterogenous types of managers survive in a market. Most of the existing theoretical
papers do not address explicitly the issue of multiple funds or heterogenous funds but
only focus on a single fund with one manager, such as Grinold and Rudd (1987), Cohen
and Starks (1988). They either investigated single manager and single investor or single
manager and multiple investors.
Moreover, this paper is the first attempt to discuss fund manager by considering
agent-based model. The highlight is that we considered the adaptive expectations and
discussed the link between incentive contract and adaptive expectation of agents. A
key assumption is that agents do not know the actual “law of motion” of the economy.
Instead, they forecast the future upon time series observations (Simon, 1982). Sargent
(1993), Evans and Honkapohja (2001) reviewed lots of related works on the adaptive
learning in macroeconomics. In those papers, agents are bounded rational and use last
observed price as an anchor and extrapolate the future price. In a series papers of Brock
and Hommes (1997, 1998, 1999), they proposed Adaptive Belief Systems (ABS) which il-
lustrated nonlinear dynamic asset-pricing models with evolutionary strategy switching.
In those models, asset price is driven by an evolutionary dynamics of different adaptive
expectations over time. Asset price fluctuations are characterised by irregular switch-
ing between a stable phase when fundamentalists dominate the market and an unstable
phase when trend chasers dominate and asset prices deviate from rational expectation
fundamentals. Boswijk et al. (2007) estimated a simple version of heterogeneous agent
models on yearly S&P 500 data and provide empirical evidence that stock prices can
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be characterised by the coexistence of two types of adaptive expectation - fundamen-
tals and trend chasers. Moreover, these ABS models have been used to evaluate how
likely it is that a stock market bubble will resume. Boswijk et al. (2007) suggested that
price deviations from benchmark fundamentals are triggered by news about economic
fundamentals but may be amplified by the strategy of trend chasers.
In our paper, two types of adaptive beliefs are observed - Trend Chaser and Contrar-
ian. The manager who behaves as a trend chaser expects prices change to continue in
the same direction. He buys assets when prices increase and sells them when prices de-
crease. On the contrary, a contrarian trader expects a reversal of the latest price change.
He acts in an opposite way with trend chaser. He sells assets out when prices increase
and buys them in when prices decrease. Brock and Hommes (1998) also investigated
these two types of trading strategies. They found that both of trend chaser and con-
trarian trader destabilise the market. Contrarians cause a lot of up and down fluctua-
tions around the fundamental, while trend chasers always trigger irregular switching
between above and below the rational expectation fundamental. Those results also ob-
served in this paper.
Intuitively, the types of compensation contract should have the same affects to trend
chaser and contrarian. However, the results show that due to the significant fluctua-
tions, the influence from compensation contract can barely be seen in the case of trend
chasers. Moreover, the coexistence of two types of contracts and two types of adaptive
expectations fails to stabilise the market. They turn the small oscillations into chaotic
fluctuations. Both of contrarian trader and trend chaser favour asset-based contract, but
there is always small fraction of them choose performance-based contract. Neither of
the compensation contracts are able to drive the other type out of the market.
This paper is also the first attempt to investigate the nonlinear dynamic behaviour
in both homogenous and heterogenous market regarding the relationships between in-
vestors and fund managers theoreticaly. Most of literature only considered one or two
periods.
In a nutshell, the main research questions addressed in the paper are: Will the type
of compensation scheme give change to the manager’s risk taking behaviour? If so,
what are their impacts to asset price and funds’ performance in the long run? Is there
any link between incentive contract and adaptive expectation? Will this link influence
the instability of financial market? Is there any type of incentive scheme particularly
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favours certain type of adaptive expectation? Furthermore, what is the policy implica-
tions regarding compensation contract?
The model and analysis in this paper provided answers to these questions at two
different aspects. Firstly, this paper reveals that the influence of compensation contract
to fund managers under different adaptive expectations are different. Trend chasers
do not care about the motivation contract. Their only concern is to chase the change
of price. No matter under which kind of contracts, we do not observe the differences
between two contracts. However, when it comes to the contrarian traders, the type of
compensation schemes plays an important role when they make decisions to choose a
portfolio. The different compensation schemes do change their risk taking behaviours.
They are willing to take more risk if under asset-based contract. Second, this paper
shows that when asset maximiser and return maximiser coexistent, asset maximisers
dominate the whole market and produce higher returns. Furthermore, this paper in-
vestigates the inertia parameter which describes the possibility of an agent sticks to his
previous strategy. The results show that it aways amplifies the fluctuations in different
types of financial markets.
This paper is organised as following. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 does the
maximisation analysis. The simulation results of both homogenous and heterogenous
market are shown in the Section 4. The final section 5 closes this paper with a summary
and conclusion.
2 The Model
2.1 Basic Setup
To begin with, assume that there are two kinds of assets in the market, a risk free as-
set and a risky asset. Agents can choose to invest in between them. Following standard
theoretical literature, the risk free asset is referred to insured deposits or government se-
curities. Risky asset stands for the market portfolio or the unit beta portfolio (Friedman
and Abraham, 2009).
In this model, we assume that the risk free asset has a return rate of r > 0 per
unit per period. The price of the risk free asset is 1. The supply of risk free assets is
infinite. The risky asset pays an uncertain dividend per unit at period t denoted by dt.
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The assumption is that the dividend follows an exponential process which is commonly
used on measuring dividend growth in finance (Asmussen et al., 2000; Albrecher et al.,
2005; Avanzi, 2009). Therefore, the dividend dt is a continuous random variable with
the probability density function of an exponential distribution as
h(x) =
βe−βx x > 00 x ≤ 0, (1)
where β > 0. The supply of the risky asset at time t is constant and is normalized to
1. The price of the risky asset per unit at time t is pt, which is determined by market
clearing.
Agents in this market are mutual fund managers and their investors. Managers
make investment decisions and recommend them to their investors. Investors choose
a fund manger to follow according to their past performances. Fund managers refer to
both the individuals who direct fund management decisions and the companies which
provide investment management services. Investors can be private investors, corpora-
tions, pension funds, charities, insurance companies and so on.
We assume that the set of managers is m and the set of investors is n. Manger k ∈
m(|m| = M) is hired by a set of investors Ik,t ⊆ n(|n| = N) at period t. AIi,t is the asset
of investor i at period t. Thus, the total assets managed by manager k at period t is
Ak,t = ∑
i∈Ik,t
AIi,t. (2)
We also assume that the overall assets from all the investors are fixed as A.
2.2 Market Clearing Price
In period t, on the one hand, fund manager k selects a portfolio (1− yk,t, yk,t), yk,t ∈ [0, 1]
according to his objective. yk,t denotes the fraction of risky assets. This portfolio is
recommended to all the investors who follow him. On the other hand, investors follow
the recommendation of their managers in a way of investing a fraction yk,t of assets to
the risky assets. The payoff of investor i in period t is yIi,t, which is given by
yIi,t = yk,t. (3)
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The individual demand function for risky assets is determined by the payoff of in-
vestor i and his assets in the previous period,
Di,t =
AIi,t−1y
I
i,t
pt
, (4)
where AIi,t−1 is the amount of the assets owned by investor i in previous period t− 1.
Because the supply of risky asset is normalised to 1, market clearing gives the market
equilibrium pricing equation as
pt = ∑
i∈n
yIi,t A
I
i,t−1. (5)
The computation of the market equilibrium shows in Appendix B.
2.3 The Objective of Fund Manager
The objective of mutual fund manager is motivated by his compensation contract with
clients. In industry practice, asset-based scheme is commonly used to compensate man-
agement. It is usually linearly depend on the value of managed assets (Deli 2002,
Palomino 2005). We assume that the payment to management is proportional to the
amount of managed assets,
Ck,t = ck,t Ak,t, (6)
where ck,t is trader fee per unit of managed asset. However, over the past few years, a
few well-known mutual fund companies have started to use performance-based incen-
tive contract. The analysis of both asset-based and performance-based fees appears to
be an important task. In this paper, we investigated the dynamic behaviour of market
under these two types of compensation schemes. We assume that managers are myopic
and make investment decisions only by forecasting the next one period. This makes
fund mangers become two types: Asset maximiser and Return maximiser.
AssetMaximiser Motivated by the asset-based compensation, asset maximiser aims
to maximise the expected overall assets he manages, even when his objective is not
aligned with investor’s welfare. Therefore, mutual fund manager’s recommend payoff
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is derived from a maximisation problem of the amount of expected assets he manages
in the following period, which is max
yk,t
Aˆk,t+1. The maximisation problem is
yk,t = argmax
yk,t
Aˆk,t+1. (7)
Return Maximiser Return maximiser type of fund manager is motivated by the
performance-based compensation contract. He shares the same goal as his clients that
he aims to maximise the return of his portfolios. Like asset maximiser, his recommend
payoff yk,t is derived from the maximisation problem of his expected objective in the
following period, which is the expected return of the portfolio, max
yk,t
Rˆk,t+1. The maximi-
sation problem is
yk,t = argmax
yk,t
Rˆk,t+1. (8)
2.4 Fund Selection By Investors
2.4.1 The Signal
The whole point of fund manger is to leave the investment management function to
the professionals. Most investors do not have the knowledge or the time to observe the
distribution of portfolio and monitor their fund managers. They always choose their
managers by observing the publicly available signals. These signals are mostly attached
with fund managers’ performances. Therefore, managers with better performances al-
ways attract more followers. In this model, signal Ui,k,t is observed by investors. It is
evaluated as the fund managers’ performance Pk,t subjects to individual investor’s error
δi,k,t:
Ui,k,t = Pk,t + δi,k,t, (9)
where δi,k,t follows a heavy side distribution.
The managers’ performance Pk,t is measured by the net realised profits as proposed
by Markowitz (1952):
Pk,t = Rk,t − c, c > 0, (10)
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where c represents the trader fee per period incurred by managers, such as the cost of
gathering information. More sophisticated strategies require higher costs. Rk,t repre-
sents return rate which is defined by using asset pricing model:
Rk,t+1 = (1− yk,t)r + yk,t( pt+1 − ptpt ) +
yk,tdt+1
pt
, (11)
where Rk,t+1 denotes the return rate of the asset from period t to period t + 1. pt is the
price of this asset in period t and dt+1 is the dividend paid at the beginning of period
t+1. The first and the second terms on the right side represent the capital gain of risk
free assets and risky assets. The third term is the dividend yield.
2.4.2 Fund Selection
Investors choose their managers by observing publicly available signal Ui,k,t which is
attached with fund managers’ performance Pk,t. Manager with better performance de-
livers stronger signal to investors. Thence, they attract more clients. We assume that the
probability for manager k to be chosen by an investor in period t + 1 is given by:
nk,t+1 =
exp(λPk,t)
Zt
, Zt =
M
∑
k=1
exp(λPk,t). (12)
Zt is a normalisation factor, so that the fraction nj,t adds up to 1. The rule is that in-
vestors tend to choose the manager who has performed well in the most recent past.
This picking rule follows a well-known discrete choice model with multinomial logit
probabilities. It describes a typical agent chooses an alternative out of a set with a finite
number of alternatives. There are several examples in a series of papers as McFadden
(1973), McFadden and Reid (1975), etc..
An important parameter λ is the sensitivity of choices. It measures how sensitive
the investors are, regarding the choice of optimal strategy. It is inversely related to
the variance of the noise terms δt. One extreme case λ = 0, corresponds to infinite
variance noise, so that differences in fitness cannot be observed and all fractions will be
fixed over time. Investors would distribute themselves evenly across the set of available
managers. On the contrary, if λ is infinite, it corresponds to the case without noise, so
that the deterministic part of the fitness can be observed perfectly. In each period, all
traders choose the optimal forecast. In our case, all investors choose the manager with
best performance.
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2.4.3 Inertia Parameter κ
Due to the cost of changing manager, sometimes investors may choose to stick to his
previous managers or wait for a few periods before switching, even though the public
information suggests the optimal strategy is to switch to a new one. Inertia parameter
κ describes this behaviour. An investor sticks to the manager he followed in previous
period with probability κ. Thus, with probability 1− κ he considers to switch and select
a manager j ∈ m(|m| = M), j 6= k. Therefore, the probability of an investor follows a
manager is
P(stay with manager k) = (1− κ)nk,t + κ (13)
P(switch to manager j) = (1− κ)nj,t
In the special case of κ = 0, every investor updates strategy and switches to a new
manager; The more general case 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1, gives some persistence or inertia in the
impact of strategies. Reflecting the fact that not all the investors update their choices
every period. κ may be interpreted as the average per period fraction of investors who
stick to their previous managers. In the extreme case of κ = 1, they would all stay with
previous managers.
2.5 The Trading Strategy of Fund Manager
2.5.1 Adaptive Expectation
In nonlinear economic models, expectations play an important role. People form their
expectations about what will happen in the future based on what has happened in the
past. For instance, the behaviour of price in the past periods will influence the peo-
ple’s expectation on price in the future. Early paper of Nerlove (1958) first proposed the
model of adaptive expectation formation of future prices. Many papers on Learning-
to-forecast experiments in Hommes et al. (2005, 2011, 2013) observed the individuals’
forecasting behaviour in the laboratory. They all found the evidences of bounded ratio-
nal and non-fundamental forecasting rules. They also suggested that agents tend to use
simple linear rules, in particular trend extrapolating rules.
In this paper, we assume that fund managers are boundedly rational. They are tech-
nical traders who use last observed price as an anchor and extrapolate future prices.
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Two classes of trading strategies are being observed: trend chaser and contrarian. These
managers believe that they can influence market prices pt. The expectation of fund man-
ager on prices in the next period is
pˆt+1 = pt + η(pt − pt−1), η ∈ R. (14)
When η > 0, manager behaves as a trend chaser and expects price changes to
continue in the same direction. He buys assets when prices increase and sells them
when prices drop. Brock and Hommes (1998) found that trend chasers trigger irregu-
lar switching between “optimism” and “pessimism”. Market price fluctuates between
temporary growing above efficient-market hypothesis(EMH) fundamental with specu-
lative bubbles and falling below the fundamental. When η < 0, manager is a contrarian
trader who expects a reversal of the latest prices change. He sells assets when prices in-
crease and buys them when prices decrease. Some empirical evidences suggested that
contrarian strategies generate significant abnormal returns over a long period, such as
Fama and French (1998), Capaul et al. (1993). Brock and Hommes (1998) showed that
contrarians cause a lot of irregular, up and down fluctuations around the fundamental.
In particular, when η = 0, pˆt+1 = pt, manager is with naive expectation and simply
uses the last observed price. This is initially proposed by Ezekiel (1938) .
2.5.2 Optimial Strategy
In each period, investors are allowed to switch their managers depending on the up-
dated signal of fund managers’ performance. In principle, they always switch to the
managers with stronger signals. However, we should note that their behaviours are
also effected by the inertia parameter κ. In this paper, we consider the optimal portfo-
lio choice of manager j at period t. He assumes that all other managers stick to their
portfolios from the previous period as yˆk,t = yk,t−1.
From the above notation, the market clearing equation (5) is rewritten as
pt =
M
∑
k 6=j
(yk,t−1Ak,t−1 + yj,t Aj,t−1) + e. (15)
To facilitate the computation, we add noises e to prices. e is positive but very close to
0. Under this assumption, there are always investors buying the risky assets so that pt
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stays positive over time. Therefore, the portfolios (1− yj,t, yj,t) recommended by fund
manager j is chosen by the way of optimising his expected compensation. His portfolios
may vary with different compensation contracts. In this case, the types of compensation
contracts play a key role on the fund manager’s optimal strategy.
Motivated by their compensation contract, Asset Maximiser aims to maximise the
overall assets he managed. His payoff yj,t is derived from the maximisation problem as
yj,t = argmax
yj,t
Aˆj,t+1. (16)
According to Equation (13), the expected assets are
Aˆj,t+1 = κAj,t + (1− κ)Anˆj,t+1. (17)
Max
yj,t
Aˆj,t+1 is thus achieved by maxyj,t
nˆj,t+1. This is easily understood on intuition. In
order to maximise the managed assets, fund manager has to attract as many investors
as possible. According to Equation (11), (12) and (14), the portfolio of asset maximiser
in period t is derived from the maximisation equation
yA,t = argmax
yj,t

∞∫
0
β
∑Mk=1 exp[λ(yj,t − yk,t−1)(r− η( pˆt−pt−1)+xpˆt ) + βx]
dx
 . (18)
Following the same idea,ReturnMaximiser is motivated by performance-based con-
tract. The fraction of risky assets in his portfolio yj,t is derived from the maximisation
problem of expected return,
yj,t = argmax
yj,t
Rˆj,t+1. (19)
According to equation (11) and (14), the portfolio of return maximiser is
yR,t = argmax
yj,t
{
(1− yj,t)r + yj,t
[
η( pˆt − pt−1)
pˆt
]
+
yj,t
β pˆt
}
. (20)
3 Maximisation analysis
In this model, fund managers are either motivated by performance-based contract or
by asset-based contract. The managers who are under performance-based contract are
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Return Maximisers. They make payoffs by maximising the portfolios’ expected returns,
which is max Rˆt+1. The managers who are motivated by asset-based contract are Asset
Maximisers. They maximise the whole asset they manage and further maximise the
probability of investors following them, which is max nˆt+1. Moreover, we assume that
these managers are boundedly rational with respect to their price expectation. They are
distinguished between Trend Chasers and Contrarian Traders.
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Figure 1: The relationship between fund manager’s payoff and the objective he makes
effort to maximise. (a) The relationship between the payoff of return maximiser and
the fund’s returns; (b) The relationship between the payoff of asset maximiser and the
possibility of investors to follow asset maximiser.
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between fund manager’s payoff and the objective
he maximises. Return maximiser aims to maximise his portfolio’s returns, while the ob-
jective of asset maximiser is to attract as many investors as possible to follow them. For
both return maximiser and asset maximiser, their optimal portfolios present similar pat-
terns with respect to adaptive expectations. When the manager is a trend chaser, with
η > 0, the relationship between the choice of risky asset’s fraction and fund manager’s
maximisation objective is convex parabola. Thence, for both return maximiser and as-
set maximiser, they always recommend extreme portfolios to their investors, such as
y = 0 or y = 1, depending on the parameters. For manager with contrarian expectation,
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η < 0, the choice of risky asset’s fraction and the objective is in a concave relationship.
His objective can be fulfilled with risky asset’s fraction in anywhere between 0 and 1
by changing the parameters. Therefore, he exhibits a behaviour less extreme compared
with trend chaser. To sum up, fund manager does alter his risk taking behaviour in
the financial market. The adaptive expectations on future price plays a key role. Even
under different types of compensation contracts, fund manager always recommends a
portfolio in response to his adaptive expectations on the trend of future asset prices.
Therefore, in the following, we are going to analysis the optimal choices of fund man-
agers’ contracts depends on the types of adaptive expectations.
4 Simulation Results
Unless stated otherwise, we use the following baseline parameter values in the simula-
tions:
• The number of investors and managers are N = 10 and M = 2. In one type
market, all the managers are same type. In two types of market, each manager
represents one type.
• In order to avoid widely fluctuations of market, we keep the parameters of man-
agers’ adaptive expectation in the range of−1 < η < 1. They are η = 0.5 for trend
chaser and η = −0.5 for contrarian trader.
• The average costs per period of managers is c = 0.1, the parameter in the density
of risky asset’s dividend is β = 0.5, inertia parameter is κ = 0.5, the sensitivity of
investor’s choice is λ = 0.9.
A summary of the main notations used in the paper is provided in Appendix A. In
the dynamic analysis, each simulation runs for T = 100 periods.
4.1 One type market
4.1.1 Dynamics under one type market
In this section, we analysis a homogenous market with one type of fund manager as
a benchmark. The assumption is that all managers use a same strategy. Based on
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the type of adaptive expectation and compensation schemes, there are four sorts of
managers (see Table 1): Trend chaser under asset-based compensation schemes, trend
chaser under performance-based compensation schemes, contrarian trader under asset-
based compensation schemes, contrarian trader under performance-based compensa-
tion schemes. Meantime, investors choose fund managers according to their perfor-
mance in the past and are also allowed to update their choices over time.
Table 1: Types of fund managers
Compensation schemes
Asset-based Performance-based
Adaptive expectations
Trend Chaser I II
Contrarian III IV
I. Trend chaser and Asset maximiser; II. Trend chaser and Return maximiser;
III. Contrarian trader and Asset maximiser; IV. Contrarian trader and Return max-
imiser.
Figure 2 presents the dynamic behaviours of the market prices, the fund managers’
payoffs and the funds’ returns in each market. As shown in Figure 2(a), the mar-
ket prices are driven by the different expectation schemes. When fund managers use
the trading strategy of trend chaser, the market exhibits highly irregular switchings of
prices; If fund managers use strategy of contrarian, market up and down oscillations.
This is the case whenever fund managers are under asset-based or performance-based
contract. Brock and Hommes (1998) also found that the presence of trend chasers or con-
trarians may lead to market instability and chaos. In particular, trend chasers trigger
irregular and unpredictable switching between the phases of “optimism’, with prices
following temporary speculative bubbles, or “pessimism”, with prices falling bellow
the fundamental. Contrarians cause a lot of irregular, up and down oscillations around
fundamental.
Figure 2(b) illustrates the dynamic behaviour of the fund managers’ choice of the
fraction of risky assets y. It also exhibits highly fluctuations in the market with trend
chasers and small oscillations in the contrarian case. This is consistent with market
prices in Figure 2(a). The intuition is that the expectation of trend chasers always drive
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them to make extreme payoffs every few periods. For instance, if market prices increase
in one period, trend chasers would expect the prices keep changing in the same direc-
tion in the future. They would raise the fraction of risky assets in their portfolios in the
next period. In one type market, all the managers behave in the same way that they
are all buying the risky assets. Therefore, the prices keep increasing and managers will
raise their risk levels further. In this way, after several periods, managers’ payoffs will
become fully risky. On the contrary, if market prices dropped, they presume another
decline and cut back the fraction of risky assets. The portfolios will have no risk at all
after a few periods. The returns of portfolios also exhibit consistent dynamic behaviours
with market prices and payoffs (see Figure 2(c)). Very high returns can be generated by
some portfolios of trend chasers due to highly risk taking behaviour. However, their
returns are unstable over time.
We should note that although the types of compensation contracts do not have as
much impact as expectations to trend chasers, they do make differences when it comes
to the market with contrarians. When these contrarians are asset maximisers and under
asset-based contract, they tend to recommend risky portfolios as shown in Figure 2(b).
Compared with return maximisers, the prices in their markets are higher. Their port-
folios give lower returns over time. When contrarians are under performance-based
contract, they decrease their risky levels. In the end, return maximisers achieve higher
returns than asset maximisers.
In general, our analysis shows that the fund managers’ adaptive expectations affect
the stability in the market. Both of trend chasers and contrarians fail to stabilise the
market. Trend chasers tend to trigger highly fluctuations of the market. This influence
are equally effective under both asset-based and performance-based contract. We also
observe the influence of different types of compensation contracts and find that they
change the risk taking behaviours of contrarians. The asset-based contract induces more
risky portfolios, while the performance-based contract motivates the portfolios with
higher returns.
4.1.2 The impact of inertia parameter κ
In the previous section, we investigate the dynamic of one type market with a bench-
mark inertia parameter κ = 0.5. It stands for the probability that an investor sticks to
his previous manager is 0.5. Because there is only one type of fund manager in the mar-
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ket, inertia parameter plays an important role on the choices of investors. Regarding
this, the impact of the changes of inertia parameter κ on the dynamic behaviour of the
market is of particular interest. To exclude other influences, such as the impact from
expectation parameter η, we analysis different homogenous markets individually. In
order to trace the impact of the changes of κ to market dynamic behaviours, we refer to
four cases of κ, which are κ = 0, 0.5, 0.8 and 1.
4.1.2.1 Contrarians
Figure 3 shows the dynamics of prices p (Figure 3a), the fund managers’ payoffs y (Fig-
ure 3b) and the returns of portfolios R (Figure 3c) in the market with one type of fund
managers. These fund managers are with contrarian expectation on the future prices.
Moreover, they are under performance-based compensation contract that their objec-
tive is to maximise the return of portfolios. To compare, each figure gives simulated
time series with respect to κ equals to 0, 0.5, 0.8 and 1.
In previous section, we showed that the market with contrarian traders was more
stable than the market with trend chasers. However, as we shall see in these figures,
the slightly up and down oscillations are amplified by raising the inertia parameter κ.
When κ is increasing from 0 to 0.5, a manager tends to increase the risk level of his
portfolios and raises the prices in the market. In particular, if κ is high, such as over
0.8, we observe significant changes of the portfolios’ risk levels in different periods. In
some periods the manager would recommend complete riskless portfolios to investors
while on the other times he may recommend highly risky ones. This behaviour makes
the market prices irregular fluctuation dramatically. We should note that the managers
in this market are also return maximisers and aim to optimise the returns of their port-
folios. However as show in Figure 3(c), with the increasing of inertia parameter, the
returns are decreasing. In this market, when inertia parameter is very high, the returns
of the managers’ portfolios become very small, even close to 0. The intuition is that the
very small returns may motivate the significant change of fund managers’ behaviours
either by increasing or decreasing their risk levels dramatically, in order to satisfy their
objective of maximising returns.
The dynamic behaviours of a market with only one type of fund managers who are
asset maximisers with contrarian expectation are shown in Figure 4. Intuitively, the
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inertia parameter κ should not influence the performance of asset maximiser, since his
only concern is to optimise the fraction of investors who follow him. However, the
dynamics shows that the slightly up and down oscillations of the market are amplified
by raising the inertia parameter κ. Moreover, price are dropping while increasing the
level of κ. It suggests the possible price bias and increasing noises given larger κ. When
κ increases, the noise is amplified and price is underestimated. However, no matter κ
changes or not, returns remain around the same level. In all, κ amplifys fluctuations
and make market price to be easily underestimated.
4.1.2.2 Trend chasers
This section investigates a homogenous market with the fund managers with trend
chaser type of expectation. Figure 5 shows the analysis of the dynamic behaviour under
performance-based compensation schemes. Figure 6 is with same format as Figure 5
and presents the analysis under asset-based compensation schemes.
Consistent with the results in Section 4.1.1, trend chasers trigger irregular and sig-
nificant fluctuations in the market under both types of compensation contracts. They
tend to recommend extreme portfolios, fully risky or complete riskless, during all the
range of inertia parameter κ. Their risk taking behaviours changes significantly over
time. Therefore, the market with trend chasers wildly fluctuates under both asset-based
and performance-based contracts. The intuition is that trend chasers always change
their risk taking behaviours based on their expectations. They expect the prices change
in the same direction as it in the past. When prices increase, they raise the risk level
of their portfolios because that they expect another increase of the prices in the future.
This speculative behaviour raises the market prices and increases managers’ risk levels
in turn. After several periods, the trend chaser expectation would drive their risk lev-
els to the extremes. Moreover, the influences of trend chaser expectations are so strong
that it dominates the dynamic behaviours of the market over time. Fund managers only
concern chasing the change of price. The influence of compensation contract can be
neglected. Therefore, the dynamics under performance-based and asset-based compen-
sations exhibit similar patterns.
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Figure 2: Dynamics of one type market. (a) Prices p; (b) Fund manager’s payoffs: the
fraction of risky asset y; (c) Returns R.
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Figure 3: Dynamics in one type market with the fund managers with contrarian expecta-
tion. The fund managers are return maximisers and under performance-based compen-
sation schemes. (a) Prices p; (b) Manager’s payoffs y; (c) Returns R.
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Figure 4: Dynamic in one type of market with the fund managers with contrarian expec-
tation. These fund managers are asset maximisers and under asset-based compensation
schemes. (a) Time series of prices; (b) Time series of the fractions of risky assets; (c), (d)
Time series of Returns.
23
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100−5
0
5
10
15
t
p
 
 
κ =0
κ =0.5
κ =0.8
κ =1
(a) Prices
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 1000
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
t
y
 
 
κ =0
κ =0.5
κ =0.8
κ =1
(b) Fraction of risky assets
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 1000.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
t
R
 
 
κ =0
κ =0.5
κ =0.8
κ =1
(c) Returns
Figure 5: Dynamic in one type of market with trend chasers and return maximisers. (a)
Prices p; (b) Payoffs y of managers. (c) Returns of the portfolios
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Figure 6: Dynamic in one type of market with trend chasers and asset maximisers. (a)
Prices p; (b) fund manager’s payoffs y; (c) returns R.
25
4.2 Two types market
In previous analysis, we investigated the dynamic behaviours of market with fund man-
agers who are under only one compensation contract. We found some differences be-
tween the influence of different compensation contract on different adaptive expecta-
tions, and also the influence of inertia parameter. However, in the real market those two
compensation schemes are coexistence. Although asset-based schemes are the domi-
nant form of compensation types in the advisory contract between mutual fund man-
ager and investors, increasing number of mutual fund companies have been involving
performance-based schemes in their contract. In particular, the larger and more com-
plex companies tend to use more explicit performance-based incentives, due to the fact
that they usually face higher direct monitoring costs. In this section, we consider het-
erogenous types of fund manager, asset maximiser and performance maximiser. In-
vestors switch between these two types of fund managers and are allowed to update
their choices over time.
Figure 8 and 7 show the dynamic behaviours of the heterogenous market with the
coexistence of return maximiser and asset maximiser types of fund managers under the
trading strategies of contrarian and trend chaser. In one type market, fund managers
behave distinct adapting two types of adaptive expectations. Trend chasers tend to trig-
ger the significant fluctuations in the market while contrarians bring the up and down
oscillations. However, as we shall see, the coexistence of asset maximisers and return
maximisers narrows the differences between these two types of trading strategies. The
dynamic behaviours of the market under contrarian expectation exhibits similar pat-
terns as the market under trend chaser expectations. Both of them are highly unstable.
The prices and the risk level of portfolios fluctuation dramatically. In another words,
the coexistence of two types of compensation schemes increase the risk level of contrar-
ians and motivates them to behave very like trend chaser. Boswijk et al. (2007) suggested
that stock market bubbles may be amplified by the strategy of trend chasers. There were
also several empirical evidences that the relative proportion among forecasting services
of trend-following beliefs compared to fundamental mean reverting rules increased in
the bubble market (Frankel and Froot, 1987; Vissing-Jorgensen, 2004). Therefore, asset-
based contract may also amplified the stock price bubble by motivating contrarian to
behave like trend chaser.
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Intuitively, the higher return should be given by return maximiser since he always
aims to optimise fund’s return. Nevertheless, on the contrary, in this market the portfo-
lios selected by asset maximisers generate higher returns than performance maximiser,
and has significant effect on the average returns of all the portfolios in the market. As
shown in the results before, inertia parameter κ would make market price to be easily
underestimated. Therefore, the negative bias makes return maximiser give lower op-
timise returns, while asset maximiser is driven by risk and in turn generating higher
returns. The fractions of investors who follow asset maximisers are around 0.9, which
leave only around 0.1 of investors to follow return maximisers. Therefore, asset-based
schemes become the dominant form of compensation type. However, either types of
compensation schemes are able to drive out the other type completely. This is exactly
what happens in real financial market. In 1996, 2,190 of 2,351 actively managed equity
mutual funds used asset-based management fees whereas only 39 used performance-
based fees (Moody, 1996). In recent years, even though performance-based fees have
been involved in a lot of larger mutual fund companies, the dominant compensation
scheme in the advisory contracts are still based on asset. For example, in 2004, only
9% of all U.S. mutual funds are under performance-based scheme (Information from
Greenwich Associates and the Investment Company Institute).
Our results can be used to explain why a majority of mutual funds favour simple
asset-based compensation schemes. This type of contract is able to motivate fund man-
agers use their recourses and expertise knowledges to attract as many assets as possible
in the market. Meantime, they also motivates the portfolios with high returns that they
contribute to most of the average return in heterogenous market. This contract is able to
meet managers’ objective and investors’ expectations at the same time. Therefore, asset
maximisers dominant the whole market and contribute to most of the average returns
in the market.
As a complementary, we also observed the market with heterogenous adaptive ex-
pectations of trend chaser and contrarian under different types of compensation con-
tracts. These markets are highly unstable and exhibit wildly fluctuations as the dy-
namics in Figure 8 and 7. Both of traders coexist with fractions varying over time and
prices fluctuating chaotically. Either of the type cannot drive out other trader types and
fail to stabilizse price fluctuations toword its fundamental value. In all our examples,
the influence of trend chaser is very strong that it always turns oscillations in market
27
into unpredictable chaotic fluctuations. The influence of motivation contract can be ne-
glected compared with it.
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Figure 7: Dynamics in a heterogenous market with return maximisers and asset max-
imisers. Fund managers are with contrarian expectation.(a) Prices p; (b) Payoffs of fund
managers y; (c) Returns R; (d) Fractions of the investors who follow different types of
fund managers n.
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Figure 8: Dynamics in a heterogenous market with return maximiser and asset maximiser.
Fund managers are with trend chaser expectation. (a) Prices p; (b) Payoffs of fund man-
agers y; (c) Returns R; (d) Fractions of the investors who follow different types of fund
managers n.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we established an agent-based model to describe the dynamic behaviours
of the financial market with mutual fund managers and investors under two types of
compensation contracts: asset-based fees and performance-based fees, using two types
of adaptive expectations: trend chaser and contrarian. In our frame work, on the one
hand, investors choose their fund managers by observing public available performance
measures. The manager with better performance attracts more followers. On the other
hand, fund managers are myopic and boundedly rational, using last observed price
as an anchor to extrapolate future price. They also motivated by two compensation
schemes: asset-based fees and performance-based fees. They motivate fund managers
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behave differently as asset maximisers and return maximisers. We aim to find the link
between the types of compensation contract and adaptive expectations.
As a benchmark, we observed homogenous market with only one type of fund man-
agers. The dynamic analysis shows that the adaptive expectations have great impact on
the stability of market. Both of trend chasers and contrarian traders make the market
less stable. In particular, trend chasers trigger the wildly irregular fluctuations, while
contrarians brings along the small up and down oscillations to the market. This is in-
fluence is equally effective under both asset-based and performance-based contract. As
for the influences from the type of compensation schemes, they do change the risk tak-
ing behaviour of contrarian traders. They are willing to take more risk when they are
under asset-based contract. However, for trend chaser, they do not care the motivation
contract, but only concern chasing the price.
Inertia parameter κ also plays an important role in the dynamic behaviours of the
market. It destabilises the market and induce market price bias. When κ increases, price
is underestimated, which makes asset-based compensation scheme generates higher
returns in heterogenous market.
In heterogenous market, the coexistence of two types compensation schemes nar-
rows the differences between trend chaser and contrarian markets. They exhibits sim-
ilar patterns. Contrarian traders behave very like trend chasers that it may amplifies
market bubbles. However, in the long run, asset maximisers dominant market. Most
of the average returns in the market are contributed by asset maximisers. In particular,
under asset-based contract, fund manager is able to maximise his own compensations
and generate a high return portfolio at a same time. These results can be used to explain
why a majority of mutual fund companies favour simply asset-based compensations
schemes.
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A Notation
• M - Number of managers
• N - Number of investors
• β - Parameter in the density of risky asset’s dividend
• d - Dividend paid to investors at the beginning of each period.
• c - Average costs per period incurred by managers, such as the cost of gathering
information.
• y - Fraction of asset which is invested into risky asset
• δ - Random noise, individual investor’s error.
• e - White noise in market price
• R - Return rate
• λ - Sensitivity of investor’s choice
• κ - Inertia parameter
• n - Fraction of investor who follows a type of manager
• η - Parameter of adaptive expectation of manager on the change of price
B Market Clearing Price
The individual demand function for the risky asset is determined by the payoff of in-
vestor and his asset in the last period,
Di,t =
AIi,t−1y
I
i,t
pt
, (21)
where Ai,t−1 is the asset owned by each investor in the last period t− 1.
Demand of the market is
Demandt =∑Di,t. (22)
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Since the supply of risky asset is normalised to 1, market clearing for the risky assets
requires
Market Equilibrium : Demandt = Supplyt = 1, (23)
∑Di,t = 1, (24)
which gives the market equilibrium pricing equation is
pt = ∑
i∈n
yIi,t A
I
i,t−1. (25)
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